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THE ECONOMICS OF SAFETY
JOSEPH J. SPENGLER*
We now know more about the topography of the moon than about the earth's
topography.
-Zdenek Kopal, TIME, Sept. 8, 1967, p. 37-
Every finite set of historical events is only a sample of what might have happened.
-LEws RxcHARsoN, STAnsncs oF DADLY QuARRELs 132 (196o).
INTRODUCTION
Kopal's textual statement, reflecting man's disposition to study the less important
at the expense of the more important, is applicable to our knowledge of "safety" and
"unsafety." Safety is, of course, a subject of many dimensions. One of these is the
economic dimension. Consideration of this dimension has two aspects: (a) to inquire
into how an optimal balance can be achieved between the value of varying degrees
of safety and the cost of providing these degrees; (b) to inquire into how combina-
tions of rewards and penalties, developed mainly within the framework of comped-
don and bargaining, can give rise to a degree of safety that is neither excessive nor
deficient but optimal in the sense that its value and cost are in balance. In what
follows an attempt is made to put some of the elements of the problem in context.
I
CHOICE
Discussion of safety, however defined, involves discussion of choice. Safety is
largely the product of human action consequent upon prior choices. The economics
of safety consists in so pricing it, or compensating its absence, as to produce the
economically optimal amount of safety at socially optimal resource cost.
Speaking very broadly, almost any human action involves choice; the external
environment delimits a range of possible actions at any given moment but does not
usually reduce that range to a single alternative. The formulation of a theory of
human action in some sphere as a theory of choice means its presentation as a
functional relation associating with each possible range of alternatives, a chosen one
among them.1
There is a set of conceivable actions which an individual [or decision-making body]
could take, each of which leads to certain consequences. The individual has in
mind an ordering of all possible consequences of actions, saying, for each pair of
consequences, either that he prefers one or that he is indifferent between them ....
*A.B. x926, M.A. 1929, Ph.D. 1930, Ohio State University. James B. Duke Professor of Economics,
Duke University.1 Arrow, Utiites, Attitudes, Choices: A Review Note, 26 ECONOMETIuCA i (1958).
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In a given situation the range of actions open to an individual is limited in some
way, . .. [say by resources available or the state of technology]. 2
As we indicate later, ordering alternatives usually is complicated by the presence
of "uncertainty" in that consequences are "not uniquely related to actions."3 Alterna-
tives among which choice must be made are not always independent; some are
complementary to others. Choices made today have implications for the chooser's
range of choice tomorrow in that some of tomorrow's resources are committed, or
the options left open to the chooser tomorrow are reduced. Choices made in respect
of augmenting safety often entail a freezing of tomorrow's resources or a narrowing
of tomorrow's options. Heavy and (often) environment-changing outlays upon
fixed capital may be made today, with the result that service and other charges are
imposed tomorrow and that choices open today are no longer available tomorrow. For
example, weather control in A can inflict great damage upon B. It is essential,
therefore, that the costing of today's choices and consequences should include a load-
ing for the sacrifice of tomorrow's options.
Under the head of tomorrow's costs of today's actions should be included allow-
ance for the fact that one consequence of such action may be the creation of groups
with vested interests in perpetuating obsolete results of today's action-for example,
current failure to outlaw privacy-invading devices and procedures spawns a class of
manufacturers and others interested in their perpetuation. Offsetting or destroying
such interest groups is likely to be costly, since organized power is more effective
than dispersed power. Today, for example, a powerful group, apparently with ties
to the military-industrial complex of which President Eisenhower warned a heed-
less public and with vast subsidies at the expense of the already well-plucked
American taxpayer, is in process of visiting the troubles of supersonic transport upon
millions of helpless residents residing in its path. Should this project be realized,
as now seems likely, the political and economic cost of doing away with it, if at all
possible, would be very expensive.
This example points to a related issue, that of making the number of choices
suffciently large to make for a relatively optimal solution. Consider the problem
of airport noise,4 one involving effects associated, as unsafety often is, with indefinite
property rights. One of three extreme choices may be chosen: prohibit planes, empty
the land near the airport of people, or make no provision for noise damage. A prefer-
able solution is to allow people to buy land near the airport at a low enough price
to compensate them for enduring the noise, and a yet more preferable one is for
the airport to buy from affected landowners rights to "dump" jet plane noise on
their land. Neither of these solutions fits supersonic transport because the swath
'Arrow, Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Choice in Risk-Taking Situations, x9 EcoNoMEICA
404 (1951).
'Id. at 405. Uncertainty may cause spending on desirable activities to be suboptimal.
'This example is taken from A.A. Alchian and W.R. Allen's excellent book, UNrvmsr-y ECONOMICS473 (1967).
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of noise is too wide. The former solution, however, fits a fairly common case, that
of occupancy of flood-prone land.
There may be yet another way out of the situation just described, namely,
suppression of the noise. This is an unlikely outcome. It does, however, illustrate
application of a principle of importance, that of the "hiding hand," which "bene-
ficially hides difficulties from us."'
Creativity always comes as a surprise to us . . . . [W]e would not consciously
engage upon tasks whose success clearly requires that creativity be forthcoming ....
... [Sjince we necessarily underestimate our creativity it is desirable that we
underestimate to a roughly similar extent the difficulties of the tasks we face, so as
to be tricked by these two offsetting underestimates into undertaking tasks which
we can, but otherwise would not dare, tackle.6
Insistence by the state on high levels of safety may, as does the practice of courts
in allowing heavy awards to injured parties, prompt a creative response that greatly
diminishes the degree of unsafety, given that so doing promises the creator sizable
profits. The situation is somewhat parallel to that in which the introduction of a
minimum wage leads to labor-displacing invention.7 One may suppose that, since
many persons prefer the small probability of a large gain to the large probability of
a small loss, and since some of these persons are creative as well, there exists enough
potential creativity to be triggered by aggressive action against unsafety, the removal
of which is likely to be quite profitable to the creator.
A somewhat parallel argument supporting aggressive public action against
sources of unsafety may be based upon the dangers to which man's great adaptability
exposes him. For this adaptability enables man "to become adjusted to conditions
and habits which will eventually destroy the values most characteristic of human
life." Men tend to adjust to ever more undesirable conditions. "The lowest com-
mon denominators of existence tend to become the accepted criteria, merely for the
sake of a gray and anonymous peace or tranquility."' A case in point is modern
man's overadaptation to noise and its dangers. Yet this noise can be prevented
through the imposition of limitations upon its generation.
II
SAFETY DEFNmD
Having dealt with the role of choice in general, we must define safety in order
to lay a groundwork for our analysis. Safety is easily defined in general terms,
but not so easily in particular terms. Defined generally, safety consists in freedom
'This paragraph is based upon Hirschman, The Pdnciple of the Hiding Hand, Tim Puauc ImTEsr,
Winter x967, at o.
aid. at X3.
7 This case is not quite parallel in that the displaced persons may not be able to find employment
elsewhere because wage rates have been pressed to too high a level by the state or a trade-union monopoly.8R. Duaos, IMN ADAPTING 278, 279 (1965).
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from the incidence of events that tend to produce harm and damage, or at least from
the harm and damage that are normal sequelae to the incidence of these events.
Thus safety against smallpox consists either in freedom from exposure to contact
with its victims, as in a smallpox-free community, or in the freedom conferred by
vaccination in the event of exposure to contact with sources of the disease.
While a general definition of safety may facilitate discourse, it can contribute little
to analysis. One must define safety-let us call it S-more specifically, to designate
freedom from specific kinds of harm and damage "caused" by a particular agency,
say an arm broken by a motor car. We may, therefore, categorize safety S more or
less finely. Thus, if we divide the universe of harm against which safety is sought
into 500 categories, we may label the categories SI, 2, ... , S,,, where n is 500. If Si
designates a broken arm, we may further categorize it S, S, . . . , Sj where 1, 2,
• . ., j designate the agencies assumed to "cause" broken arms. Should yet further
subdivision be required, additional subscripts may be employed to identify the condi-
tions isolated, say Sill, 512,.... , Slim.
It is not possible to say except conjecturally what complete safety signifies in
terms of the well-being of individuals. A state of complete safety is nonexistent just
as is a state of zero safety. Indeed, achievement of a state of complete safety would
entail waste of society's resources. We may, however, describe and perhaps measure
the impact of an increase or a decrease in safety. We may imagine an individual
situated at a chosen point on the highest preference function currently accessible to
him. If safety is increased (decreased) he will move to a higher (lower) function at
a corresponding point unless the price structure should also change. One can, there-
fore, put a value on the change in the degree of safety. Presumably, successive incre-
ments of safety add diminishing increments of well-being while successive decrements
subtract increasing amounts of well-being from the level serving as a point of
departure. Moreover, incremental costs of safety eventually rise faster than its incre-
mental benefits; then further increase in safety is wasteful.
Safety, however broken down and specified, can seldom if ever be defined in
absolute terms. For reasons touched upon later, we can seldom say that safety against
some particular harm is complete where unity designates completeness. Safety may,
in theory, range between o and i.o in a community. In practice, however, safety will
range only between o and some positive value < i.o, say o.8. We may then define
unsafety U for a community, as i-S, and a particular kind of unsafety U1 as i-Si. In
the individual case, of course, even though (say) Si < i.o, the potential safety of any
particular member of this community will lie between o and i; for the value o.9
is a probable value inferred from past experience and applicable to the whole com-
munity but not to any individual.
While the ruling or actual community value for (say) S is o.8, this value may be
susceptible of increase. Let us call the actual community value SiG and the maximum
attainable value Si". If Si? < 1m where Sl - 0.9, then the value of Ui can be re-
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duced from o.2 to o.i and that of S1 can be increased to 0.9. It does not follow, how-
ever, that it would pay to increase the value of S from o.8 to o.9; doing this may
require the absorption of scarce resources with alternative uses that are more sig-
nificant than the stipulated increase in the value of St. This case is but a species of
a genus; it is seldom if ever economically worthwhile to undertake a hundred per
cent realization of that which is technologically possible. It could never pay to
make agriculture depend significantly upon desalinated water. Indeed, as Shake-
speare remarked, "Striving to better, oft we mar what's well."
Normally, safety is conceived of in specific terms, of Si rather than of S. It is
possible, however, to conceive of safety in general for a community, designating it as
before by S. S is then arrived at by aggregation, but with allowance for inter-
dependence among Si, S2 , etc. Then S' would represent the aggregate of the actual
values S, 1 , Sa, etc., and S", would designate the aggregate of the maximum values
S-,, S'2, etc.
Safety and unsafety may be expressed in subjective as well as in objective terms.
Given enough information of the sort that exists and can be assembled, safety at
the community level may be expressed in terms of probability, that is, in an objective
measure of the relative frequency of S and U. This objective measure will com-
pletely determine the relevant conduct of individuals, however, only if the belief
in safety coincides with its objective value and the significance of that value at the
individual level. Moreover, even given the existence of an objective measure (the
existence of which may be subject to doubt in a dynamic world), men may "enter-
tain a rational preference for one belief over another" on "rational grounds other
than statistical frequency."' They can proceed from premises "to conclusions which
are reasonable but not certain."'" If men are irrational or superstitious, the role of
belief may be much more powerful. This is evident in primitive societies and in
societies which harken readily to priestly promises and prospectuses devised by
rhetors. Remarkable, for example, was the behavior of property-holders in eleventh-
century Europe, moved by the rhetoric of Pope Urban II. Apparently counting upon
material as well as spiritual gain from participation in the Crusade, they sold im-
mobile property for a fraction of its then usual value and used the proceeds to
purchase crusade-supporting mobile property at unusually high prices." Even in
modern and presumably more rational societies, untutored belief can play an im-
portant role. For example, there is a "folklore of accidents," and a widespread belief
that "accidents somehow mysteriously defy any kind of systematic study beyond
mere tabulation."' 2  Even in the absence of folklore and in the presence of con-
siderable information, the beliefs of men tend to differ. These differences produce
0 J.M. KEYNES, A TREATISn ON PROBABILITY 97 (921). On the resemblance of some underwriting to
making book, see id. at 22-23, 404-05.
'old. at 98.
11J. TkiPsO, AN ECONOMIc AND SociAL HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE AGES (300-1300) 392 (i928).
NV ,. HADDON, JR., E. SUCHNMAN & D. KLEIN, ACCIDENT RESEARcH 6 (1964).
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marked variation in the reactions of individuals to given safety situations. They
also affect the assessments individuals make of the values to be put upon the




The well-being of any given'" individual is a function, ceteris paribus, of his
personal safety, which is a function in turn of the value of his community's particular
safety Si (or of S, if safety in general is under consideration). Suppose that the
value of Si is o.6 and that the maximum currently attainable value of S1 (i.e., S1 ') is
o.8; then the well-being W associated with S, [i.e., W(S1)] is less than the well-
being associated with S,'m [i.e., W(S)]. W(Si), when S1 - o.6, can be increased
to W(Sm) in two ways: (a) the value of Sz can be increased (say) from o.6 to 0.8;
or (b) each individual can be compensated in such amount C that the welfare associ-
ated with Ci [i.e., W(C1)], when added to W(Si), is equivalent to W(SI,). It may
be possible, furthermore, to increase well-being enough so that it corresponds to
what it would be if Si - i.o. The economic choice posed is: does course (a) or
course (b) cost more? The less expensive of the two courses is the preferable one.
Since the indifference map fixing the trade-offs between more (less) safety (i.e.,
A Si) and less (more) compensation (i.e., A Ci) varies with each individual, no
arrangement for compensation to offset U will satisfy every member of a com-
munity in the same measure. Consider a community in which S = o.8 and U1 =
o', and in which, therefore, U1 is distributed over a small fraction of the com-
munity's population. Provision might then be made (say) for enough C1 to counter-
balance U1 sufficiendy to prevent U from reducing welfare W at all, or more than
a small amount below what W(Sz) would be if Si = .o. The funds making C1
possible will normally be provided under a risk-pooling and sharing arrangement,
a joint voluntary insurance arrangement whereunder the actual or recognized loss
in welfare associated with U1 is shared. Most individuals prefer to bear the certain
cost of a small insurance premium to the small chance of a large loss associated
with the actual incidence of nonsafety, even though receipt of C1 may be subject to
the possibility of default on the part of the payer contractually responsible for
C1.'4
" One is always tempted to say "rerpresentative" individual. Yet such an expression ignores the
variation from individual to individual in reaction to a particular state of communal unsafety, even given
similar information. See, e.g., Morgan, Who Uses Seat Belts?, i9 BuvioRAL SCIENCE 463 (1967). Of
course, if a certain distribution of individual attitudes exists and the curve representing this distribution
is stable, changes in the response of any one individual to changes in S may be used to indicate the
nature of the response of a community to changes in its S.
"' While this pooling arrangement may or may not affect the degree of unsafety, U1, it probably
reduces the financial reserves required to meet the money outlay made necessary by U1 . It also reduces
the real cost of "untoward contingencies," by diffusing their "consequences." It is "better for two men
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IV
CAUSATION
Increasing the value of safety S1, S2, etc., calls for more specificity than does making
provision for compensation required to offset unsafety MU1 (i-Si). In the latter
case, it is necessary only to know the probability of incidence of U1, together with
the degree of compensation to be provided and the cost of administering the loss-
sharing, risk-pooling arrangement. Increase of Si, on the contrary, calls for careful
analysis of the circumstances with which S and U1, respectively, are associated, that
is, of the "causation" of Si and U1.
Application of the concept of causality in the field of behavioral science is very
difficult, causal explanation itself being the product of nineteenth-century mechanics.
It is most applicable in a very limited spatio-temporal context in which "as more
and more intermediates are identified the causal connection is more and more fully
specified." In relatively unlimited contexts, on the contrary, "causal explanation is
correspondingly irrelevant."15  What is required is explanation, intelligibility.'0
What is needed in respect of the study of safety and unsafety with the object of
reducing U and increasing S is inquiry into the pattern of immediate antecedents and
concomitants of S and U; these will yield explanation.
The concepts of causation employed in law are of little use in the explanation of
unsafety. For that matter, as economists have shown, the application of "causal"
analysis to the effects of particular economic legislation upon economic behavior
may reveal these effects to be negligible or even detrimental.'7  Concepts of legal
causation may, however, contribute to the devising of means to reduce unsafety U.
These concepts focus attention upon the roles of human agents in chains of "causa-
tion" and help to impute responsibility or irresponsibility for U to these agents.'
These concepts may, therefore, contribute to the erection of safety-increasing arrange-
ments, for they direct attention to purpose, to purposive behavior, the manipulation
of which by economic and other means can, within limits, reduce the magnitude
of U (ie., iS)19
to lose one eye than for one to lose two," for many to be wounded than a few to be killed. See F.
KNIGHT, Ris, UNCERTAINrY, AND PRox'r (1921). On the impact of diversity of tastes upon the demand
for insurance, see Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 Am. EcoN. REv. 531 (x958).
"
5 Kaplan, Noncausal Explanation, in CAUSE AND EFFECT 145, 146 (D. Lerner ed. 1965).
"I1d. at 147-48.
"
T E.g., Stigler & Friedland, What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity, 5 J. LAw &
EacoN. I (1962).
" Golding, Causation in the Law, 59 J. PsnLososrrY 85 (z967); H.L.A. IART & A. HoNoRA, CAusA-
TIoN xbs THE LAw (959); H.M. Hart, Jr. & J. McNaughton, Some Aspects of Evidence and Inference in
the Law, in EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE 48 (D. Lerner ed. 1959). Legal changes may promote allocative
efficiency. Mishan, Pareto Optimality and the Law, i9 OxFoRD ECoN. PAPERS 276 (1967). See also
Fuller, Freedom as a Problem of Allocating Choice, I= Am. PIL. SoC'Y PROCEEDINGS 101 (1968).
M.S. Schulzinger concludes that while a satisfactory theory of accident causation has not yet been
evolved, "nearly all the causative factors of accidents ultimately relate to the human factor." M.
SCHULZINGER, Tim ACCIDENT SYNDROME 15 (1956).
"On purpose, see Kaplan, supra note 15, at 152-53; see also Feuer's discussion of interventionism in
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It is seldom easy and cheap to reduce unsafety U and increase safety S (= i-U).
Unsafety is of diverse origin, human (e.g., riot), nonhuman (e.g., earthquake), or
both. The genesis is more likely to be complex than simple. Thus, unsafety may be
the product of chance intersection of causal chains.2" Often it is the result of a
tendency for small circumstances to become conjoined in time and space. Auto acci-
dents are illustrative. It is often alleged that high-speed driving is a major "cause" of
serious accidents. In fact, however, according to one inquiry, fatal accidents are
largely the result of a teaming up of small things. "A list of the causes of any
hundred fatal accidents would run over two hundred items."" "Safety campaigns"
based on false assumptions can, therefore, be "a menace," serving only to "add an-
other disturbing" ingredient to the complex of elements generating highway prob-
lems. There is even "evidence that lowering speed limits tends to induce accidents,
whilst raising the limits prevents them. 22 Only detailed study of a particular kind
of unsafety can disclose its genesis and reveal whether it is the product of easily
isolated agents, of conjunctions of small factors, or of sets of occurrences that are
not reducible to terms of simple "causation" and individual responsibility. Irre-
sponsible behavior is, of course, a frequently contributing element even as the doctrine
of "contributory negligence" holds. What is important for the present discussion,
however, is not the complexity of the explanations of a great deal of unsafety but
their bearing upon the cost of increasing safety and upon modes of dealing with
the issues involved.23
Any discussion of "causation" must take into account the negative and the
positive contributions of the state and its agencies to safety and unsafety. These
contributions help to shape the environment within which safety-affecting behavior
takes place. The state may fail to act, it may stress the unimportant at the expense
of the important, and it may generate unsafety as such. Typical of failure by the
state to augment safety when it could is illustrated by its action in respect of X-ray
exposure, of inadequate supervision of clinical laboratories as well as of the use of
DDT, of radioactive fallout, and of failure to provide adequate air-traffic control.
Thus, dispersed radioactive fallout may eventually become concentrated again in
milk and afflict the thyroid glands of children. Again, it is said that 3,500 to 30,000
deaths occur yearly because of the cumulative effects of radiation associated with
Causality in the Social Sciences, in CAusE AND EFFECT, supra note 15, at 391. See also E. NAOEL, TsIM
STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE 24-25, 402-03, 554-55 (g6i).
'*E NACEL, supra note i9, at 326-29. Some of the chains described in T. ,ViL.DE, ThE BIDGo Oa
SAN Luis REY (r927), are illustrative.
2 Schwartz, The Case for Fast Drivers, HARPER's MAAOZINE, Sept. 1963, at 65, 68. The courts may,
however, be on the verge of holding automobile manufacturers liable for accidents associated with
speeding. TIME, Aug. 25, 1967, at 48. Bartenders may incur liability for accidents if they permit
drinking to excess by drivers of cars.2 Schwartz, supra note 21, at 65-66, 67.
" Aspects of accident causation are dealt with in W. HADDON et al., supra note 1z, and M. ScIruLzINOER,
supra note I8.
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therapeutic diagnosis in which the radiation hazard commonly runs from several
to one hundred times what it need be. This unnecessary multiplication of hazard
could be prevented through appropriate regulation of personnel and equipment.2 4
Also representative, though more difficult to cope with, is unsafety connected with
air travel. This unsafety is associated in part with traffic density, itself a consequence
both of urban conglomeration financed in part by government and of the failure of
Congress, together with its agencies, to take sufficient corrective action or force the
responsible airlines to take action. 25  It is even possible that the state, by enacting
employment-limiting minimum-wage laws and related measures, has worsened the
health of many denied both work and therapeutic substitutes for work. It is possible
also that the state, by enforcing unduly restrictive licensure provisions within the
area of medical service, has sufficiently reduced the number of medical personnel to
offset the effect of increase in quality and has thereby argumented the number of
days of illness per person above the attainable level.
What appear to be instances of stressing the less important at the expense of the
more important may also be noted. Illustrative is the prolongation of the lives of
the physically helpless, or the heavy emphasis put upon the association of relatively
high mortality with the use of cigarettes. Comparison of the costs and results of
this campaign, initiated largely by the Public Health Service, with what the same
outlay could do if spent in other health areas, might reveal the latter use to be
preferable. Concentration of scientists on $50 billion post-Apollo space programs as
well as on weaponry in the name of man's safety reduces emphasis upon biomedical
science and man's biological health 2' even as heavy expenditure upon delusory
civil defense and admittedly ineffective defenses against long-range missiles diverts
resources from safety-increasing areas of investment. Concentration on time-
consuming and minority-affecting organ transplants or on the reduction of unsafety
associated with less important diseases, usually in response to the ballyhoo of tele-
vision "personalities" and the misdirected gifts of governments and the gullible,
-' See, e.g., Nader, X-Ray Exposures, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 2, 1967, at ii; see also TIME, Sept. 8,
xIP67, at 69. Various destructive chain reactions are described by Barry Commoner in SCIENCE AND
St rIVAL (1966).
" Years must pass before the fancy solutions put forward by so-called experts can ease the impact of
dcnsity in some metropolitan areas, should that prove possible at all. Indeed, the introduction of giant
plancs will probably increase density and the annual air death toll. See U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT,
Jan. I, x968, at 54; TIME, Sept. 8, 1967, at 56; Ridgeway, Air Accidents, NEw REPUBLIC, Aug. 5, 1967,
at I2. "Congress was horrified when three astronauts were asphyxiated and died in a fire on the launch
pad"; its pressure promptly brought about corrective action. This same Congress has remained in-
enslitive to hundreds of deaths (perhaps because they may not be "in the line of duty") caused by
esscntially preventable air accidents, among them those caused by private planes. Id. at 13. An un-
st Lttically minded federal government "seems intent on supporting the expansion and maintenance of
z,o,. oo private planes in this 'rich man's' private fleet at the expense, both in terms of money and lives,
of the millions of people who ride on the 2,000 commercial airliners." Near Miss, NEW REPUBLIC,
Aug. 5g, 1967, at 8. See generally Fromm, Aviation Safety, in this symposium, p. 590; NATIONAL
AADE MY OF ENGINEERING, CIVIL AviATIoN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPIMENT: AN ASSESSMENT OF FEDERAL
INVOLVEMENT (1968).
"s See, e.g., A. WEINBERG, REFLECTIONS ox BIG SCIENCE (5967).
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may augment the unsafety associated with important diseases.27  Asymmetrical ex-
penditure such as that upon death control unaccompanied by compensating expendi-
ture upon birth control may tend to generate more illfare than welfare.
Government subsidization of supersonic transport illustrates how the state can
produce situations unfavorable to safety. The federal government is contributing
several billions to this project and, should it finally materialize, will be under
pressure to contribute many more billions to the accommodation of airport facilities
for use by this dinosaurian craft. This aircraft will dump a thunderous sonic boom
upon people in a fifty to sixty mile path below the plane, causing extensive damage
to health and property. This prospect, together with the failure of the plane's
architects to do anything effective to meet it, apparently is receiving little attention
from the very governmental agencies that are promoting the project2 These, along
with congressional spokesmen for aviation interests, appear to be more concerned
for the profits of a few than for the comfort and safety of millions of citizens.
One might also point to a somewhat similar relationship between the interests of a
few and the safety of the many, manifest in the pursuit of foreign policies by a
sequestered few in the executive branch of governments, in greater or less disregard
of the probable impact of these policies upon the health and safety of die underlying
population. Some, though not all, of the situations in which a state has become on
balance a source of unsafety is largely a joint product of two sets of conditions: (a)
uncertainties associated with the impact of the twentieth-century technological revo-
lution upon man's physical and social environment; and (b) continuation of the
political control of this environment in the hands of special interests and of public
personages whose training, legal and otherwise, is unsuited to coping with this
impact.
IV
DYNAMIC VERSUS STATIC SOCIETIES
Reconciling the search after safety with the search for progress is conditioned by
how dynamic a society is, and by how long it takes a chain reaction to eventuate in
injury of the innocent. When a society is dynamic, the rule of legal precedent,
however important,29 tends to become less binding in respect to matters of safety as
well as to other matters, particularly if the rule in question relates in some measure
to substance instead of to the mode of dealing with substance. In Blackstone's still
" See, e.g., Rottenberg, The Allocation of Biomedical Research, 57 AM. EcoN. REv. (PAPEtRs AND
PRoCEED Ncs) Xo9 (1967), and Klarman's comments, id. at 151.
" Samuelson, The SST and the Government: Critics Shout into a Vacuum, 157 ScIENCE 1146-5
(1967); Enke, Government-Industry Development of a Commercial Supersonic Transport, 57 Am. EcoN.
RaV. (PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS) 71 (1967), and Moore's comments, id. at io2. On an uncirculated secret
report critical of the SST, see Evans & Novak, The SST Coverup, Washington Post, Aug. lo, 2967, at
Ax7, col. i. See also Lardner, Supersonic Scandal, NEw REPUBLIC, March 16, 1968, at x3; NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING, supra note 25.
9 On the importance of relative constancy of law through time, see L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF
LAw 79-31 (964).
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static England, "the duty of the judge" was "to abide by former precedents,"3 and
even in America stare decisis long remained both a "moral" and a "legal obligation. ' l
Yet in this century the grip of stare decisis has been relaxed through the multiplici-
tion of cases and situations in which the principle is difficult to applyY2 The oppor-
tunity for flexible policy thus exists.
Turning from legal to economic aspects of dynamics, we may say, perhaps with
some exaggeration, that if an economy is static, cumulating experience may finally
render nearly all change foreseeable, or at least expressible in terms of probabilify.
Ignorance diminishes and with it uncertainty in the sense of that which is nin-
predictable, actuarially or otherwise. 3 In such a static or nondynamic society, it is
reasoned, the future, together with expectations warranted thereby, would be
sufficiently foreseeable or assessible in actuarial terms to permit entrepreneurs to
estimate costs and returns and hence to hire and pay inputs in keeping with their
productivity. A principal result would be that no residual "profits" or "losses" would
emerge? 4  Moreover, even should this society become subject to change that was
foreseeable, uncertainty would still be absent and the outcome would be the same,?
In a nonstatic society subject to change that is neither foreseeable nor susceptible of
reduction to actuarial terms, ignorance of the future is great, and uncertainty .is
present everywhere and incident in some degree upon each 'and all except insofar
as it has been shifted to specialists in uncertainty-bearing" who experience either
"profit" or "loss."3"
While searchers after explanations of the emergence of profit were the first to
distinguish analytically between dynamic and static societies and between societies
relatively free of uncertainty and those ridden with it, the distinction is quite im-
portant for the analysis of safety, unsafety, and policies pertinent thereto. It is
true, of course, that Knight's analysis, including his distinction between "risk" and
" T. HOLLAND, THE ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE 69 (i2th ed. 1917), citing x BLACxsToNE, Com-
MENTARIES 69 (2d Am. ed. 1799). But even Blacksone recognized that "this rule admits of exceplia,
where the former determination is most evidently contrary to reason .. " Id. at 70.
't Larremore, Stare Decisis and Contractual Rights, 22 HARV. L. Ray. i82, x89 (39o8).
m Hamilton, judicial Process, 7 ENcyc. Soc. SCI. 452 (1932).
'a The presence of "runs" makes very long periods essential to the correct determination of aqy
"normal" actuarial values. i W. FELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROBAaILITY THEORY AN) ITs APPLIA-
TIONS 67-69, 83-85 (2d ed. 396o). When "chance fluctuations" involve "cumulative effects," the resus%
of stochastic processes "should serve as a warning to those who are prone to discern secular trends and
deviations from average norms." Id. at 68.
"'See F. KNIGHT, supra note 14, pts. I and 2.
" Id., ch. 5. As noted, even in an essentially static society, a priori and a posteriori probabilities may
not coincide, with the result that what appear to be trends but are not trends may be suggested by the
data. W. FELLER, supra note 33, at 67-68, 83-85.
"a F. KNIGHT, supra note 14, Pt. 3. Uncertainty seldom can be entirely shifted; whence nearly every
income includes an element of profit. Id. at 366-67.
" "Change according to a known law does not give rise to profit, nor does risk if measurable, since
it can be eliminated by insurance or some equivalent device." Id. at xi. When uncertainty rules, and
"risks," being "chiefly of the nature of chances of errors in judgment," are "not measurable, becauRe
too unique to form into classes," "profit" or "loss" emerges. Id. at xiii.
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uncertainty," is considered defective s It is also true, however, that, since man's
world is ridden with uncertainty, he must carefully consider the consequences likely
to ensue if he responds to uncertainty in one way rather than another. Alternatives
need to be ordered in terms of their relative desirability,"0 and societies need to be
equipped with institutions capable of coping with uncertainty, though not at the
expense of salutary change and progress0  Modern worlds as well as the homosphere
are shot through not only with "chance" conjunctures and stochastic processes but
also with organized and deliberate efforts to produce change and bring into being new
genera as well as new species of goods and services. The outcomes are predictable
only in part, since novelty and serendipity are always present.
The dynamic character of modern society makes it much more difficult to deal
with safety and unsafety in terms of controlling U optimally and establishing legal
precedents well adapted to continuing optimality. When uncertainty reigns, it is
often difficult to foresee the consequences of measures, among them those designed
to increase safety, and this difficulty tends to be accentuated when externalities are
present. The sources of unsafety may be inconspicuous if, after the manner of the
slowly grinding mills of the gods, they generate unsafety at a low rate and with
accumulating but delayed impact; yet in time they can give rise to much harm and
damage. Illustrative are possible effects of upsetting ecological balance by destroying
certain types or strains of life, but without making provision for counterbalancing
tb adverse effects of this destruction. Potentially illustrative is the fact that man
is almost on the verge of being able to "program his own cells with synthetic in-
formation," though lacking in capacity to put this knowledge to optimal use.41 Man's
ery attempts at eradicating disease may backfire by giving rise to adverse effects that
baance or outweigh the beneficial effects of the eradication program.4 Similarly,
his efforts at riverine flood control may increase unsafety along seacoasts. Even in
the realm of crime control, outcomes may differ from intentions. Thus, augmenting
the security of criminals may diminish that of productive members of society-impose
new costs of self-protection on citizens, and reduce the return on investment in
law enforcement. Similarly, coddling rioters clearly jeopardizes the life and property
of the law-abiding in the short run,4" but the alternative of escalating or failing
to de-escalate violence in our cities may in the long run generate new hostilities and
new insecurity for all citizens; optimality of long- and short-run costs and benefits
$a Arrow, supra note 2, at 404, 417-18, 426-28.
"' See discussion in id. at 405-06, 434-35; see also Arrow, supra note i, at 1, 4-6.
40 See F. KNIGHT, supra note 14, ch. 12. Today much thought is being given to the future, but the
finilings have not yet become specified enough to permit much evasion of uncertainty, even by large
enterprises. See, e.g., TiE FTuis-r, a journal started in 1967; the Summer 1967 issue of DAEDAL103
devoted to the year 2ooo; H. KAHN & A. WiENER, THE YE.AR 2000 (1967).
"
1 See editorial entitled Will Society be Prepared, 157 SCIENCE 633 (1967).
"
2 Barlow, The Economic Effects of Malaria Eradication, 57 AM. EcoN. Rav. (PAPERS AND PROCEaD-
Isle) 130 (1967), and Newman's comments, id. at 155.
S '5 ee, Who Pays for Riots, Tiara, Aug. 4, 1967, at 68. Riot insurance is becoming more costly and/or
uhavailable.
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is again the goal to be sought, and one must count all the costs including those
attributable to lost respect for the effectiveness of law and law enforcement and to
the reactions of law-abiding citizens to apparent toleration of threats to their safety.
As another dismal byproduct of a constitutionally derived luxury that may cost uis
more in unsafety than we realize we may note the irresponsible news and entertain-
ment media, ever wrapped in the white robes of "freedom of the press" as they
generate mass violence.4
Man lives in a world not only dominated by uncertainty but also bound together
by economic, ecological, and various other ties of interdependence. As a result,
changes in any one sector are likely to produce changes, good or bad, in other
sectors. Some of these changes are quite unpredictable; one cannot always foretell
whether an increase in short-run safety is being purchased at the expense of long-
run safety. Yet risks must be undertaken in the hope that the aggregate of well-
being will be increased. A ship captain cannot, Thomas Aquinas long ago re-
marked, avoid navigation merely in order to preserve his ship."5
V
EXTERNALITIES
The matter of externalities was raised in 1859 by John Stuart Mill when he dis-
tinguished between self-regarding and other-regarding actions and declared only
the latter to be subject to the jurisdiction of society."6 On Mill's principle, should an
individual allegedly endanger his life-expectancy by smoking cigarettes, the decision
to smoke or not to smoke is his own, not that of any external agency 7 It is ques-
tionable, therefore, except from the point of view of a contingent-fee lawyer, to hold
a cigarette company liable for a smoker's death from a cancer not certainly traceable
to any one cause, among them smoking, which an individual does voluntarily even
after a link between smoking and cancer has been alleged. More generally, when
an individual's actions affect only his own safety, the actions in question are entirely
within his own jurisdiction. This is not so when others are affected; then the actor
may be required to suspend his actions or negotiate with the affected persons
regarding just compensation for their actual or possible injury. Mill would hardly
have endorsed the doctrine that drunkenness, glue sniffing, or use of marijuana or
"See Methwin, Mass Media and Mass Violence, NEw LE.ADER, Jan. 15, 1968, at 6.4
aSUMIMA THEOLOGICA, pt. I-I, q. 2, art. 5. See L. FULLER, supra note 29, at 8_5.
46 "As soon as any part of a person's conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others, society has
jurisdiction" over it, and the question whether the general welfare will or will not be promoted
by interfering with it, becomes open to discussion. But there is no room for entertaining any
such question when a person's conduct affects the interests of no persons besides himself, or needs
not affect them . . .. In all such cases, there should be perfect freedom, legal and social, to do
the action and stand the consequences."
J.S. M IL, Ows LiBFryT 372 (P. Wheelwright ed. 1935). There is not involved here limitation upon the
range of choice to which the individual often is subject. See FULLa, supra note 18.
"'To those who would point to the security of the smoker's family, Mill would probably have noted
that exposure to higher mortality can be offset by carrying more insurance.
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LSD somehow frees individuals of full responsibility for their actions while under
the influence of these intoxicants or drugs. He would have noted that which the
courts and juries often overlook, namely that an individual is fully responsible
when he begins to drink to excess and thus sets in motion a stream of actions which
eventuate in harm to others.
Policies respecting safety and unsafety must, as Mill implied, take into account
externalities when these exist. They are present when either costs, including un-
safety U, or benefits, including safety S(-- i-U), or both, are incident in part upon
individuals who are not parties to the transactions or contractual or other arrange-
m~ents that give rise to these costs and benefits. If unsafety (safety) were an entirely
random product, the result of many small actions, or the product of the specifically
imputable behavior of one or more individuals, and if its disadvantages (advantages)
were widely dispersed in very small quantities, or were incident entirely upon the
responsible source, the subject of externalities might be ignored. But they are
present in all societies, and above all in dynamic modern societies in which many
ties bind men together and many channels carry afar both slowly-maturing and
rapidly-developing consequences of what superficially appear to be relatively localized
actions. Quite illustrative are the actions which have polluted man's environment
until now (e.g., spread of DDT; effects of seawater pollution). It is said that it
will take thirty years and $3oo billion to make air and water clean in the United
States. Who foresaw in i932 that opening a deep Welland Ship Canal would
eventually pollute the beaches and damage the fishing industry of Lake Michigan?
And, had it been foreseen, would corrective measures have been taken, since at the
time neither the principle of private property nor an alternative set of rules was
operative? Today, actions reducing salinity and deepening channels are making the
Suez Canal a channel for marine life that could produce catastrophic results among
the fauna of the Mediterranean by 1970.48 As of now, adverse effects of the sort
just described tend to be viewed as fortuitous byproducts of action rather than as
foreseeable risks susceptible to rational calculation and hence subject to remedy
under the law of torts or under an appropriate set of arrangements designed to
parallel the law of torts. Some sort of protection against excessive use of herbicides
and unnecessary food irradiation may also be indicated.
When externalities exist, those with whom unsafety or safety originates bear only
some of the costs or reap only some of the rewards of their safety-affecting activity.
In consequence, too much unsafety and too little safety tends to be generated. Illus-
trative in a variety of ways is the pollution inflicted on innocent parties by manu-
facturers, public agencies, private households, and others.40
4 Gunnar Thorson's forecast in an address given before a conference on marine biology at Duke Uni-
versity, reported in the Durham Morning Herald, Sept. 17, 1967, at 6A, col. I. See also Rubinoff, Central
American Sea-Level Canal: Possible Biological Eflects, 161 SCIENCE 857 (1968).
"' On the nature of the externalities problem see Copeland, Communities of Economic Interest and the
Price System, in THE TREND OF ECONOMICS 1o5 (R. Tugwell ed. 1925). On pollution viewed as an
externality see CONTROLLING POLLUTION (M. Goldman ed. x967).
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Turning now to the externality component of safety-affecting actions, we may
order them over a range running from cases in which externalities are negligible,
through a stretch of cases in which externalities are of significant magnitude, to cases
in which safety is or approximates a public good and unsafety is or approximates a
negative public good. Negligible cases may be ignored on economic grounds alone.
The intermediate stretch of cases is subject to corrective intervention if such action
is possible and the cost of intervention falls sufficiently short of the rectificatory bene-
fits produced. When, however, the benefits of safety or the disadvantages of un-
safety are collective in nature, governmental supplementation of market forces may
no longer prove adequate. For then safety cannot be marketed to individuals at
prices which equal or fall short of the marginal valuation the beneficiaries set
upon particular quantities of "safety" or of "avoidance of unsafety." The amount
of "safety" consumed by A does not limit the quantity available for consumption
by B; each consumes the same amount even though A may place a higher marginal
valuation upon this amount than does B. Under the circumstances, therefore, safety
is a product available to all persons subject to its incidence. Illustrative is the
safety supplied through flood-control measures, or the unsafety generated by the
state or by large-scale enterprisesP °
Unsafety assumes the form of a negative public good when it is generated or
fostered by the state, by one of its agencies, by a city, or by a large corporation
deriving support from the state. Mention has already been made of supersonic
transport and of large-volume pollution of air and water. Underlying such welfare-
reducing actions by the state is the shortage of technical personnel capable of esti-
mating the consequences of technological change and informing the Congress and
its agencies accordingly. This shortage leads to imperfect analysis of safety-affecting
problems by governmental agencies5' and makes members of Congress, few of whom
are technologically competent, more amenable to the Circean whispers of special
interests. 2
VI
SAFETY AND THE MARKET
Safety may be treated as a resource-absorbing commodity or service. Its produc-
tion therefore involves the allocation of resources to the production of safety and the
allocation of the resulting safety to those in need of it and entitled to it because they
'0 On externalities see W. BAUmOL, ECONOMIC TiEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 368 (zd ed. 1965);
Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q. J. EcON. 351 (1958); R. MUSGRAVE, THE THEoRY oF PuBLIC
FINANCE, pts. I-I (z959); Samuelson, Aspects of Public Expenditure Theories, 40 REV. EcoN. & STATISTICS
332 (1958). See also, New Thrill for Motorists, NEw REPUmBIC, Oct. 5, 1968, at 6, discussing the threat
to safety posed by the "truck-train" bill pending before Congress.
" See, e.g., Report Whitewashes Blackout, INDUSTRIAL REsEARCH, Sept. 1967, at x8, on the lack of
technical sophistication in the Federal Power Commission's report on the 1965 northeast blackout. See
also, Why the Power Failures and Why More May Come, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, June i9, x967,
at 76.
" On Congress's lack of technical counsel, see Costi, Who Tells Congress About Technology, IN-
DUsTiAL RESEARCH, Sept. 1967, at 78.
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have paid for it in some fashion. These two allocative functions can be performed,
at least suppositiously, by the market, through other institutional arrangements, or
through a combination of these two means. The object of allocation is to produce
safety in the right amount, supply this amount as cheaply as possible, and allocate it
appropriately.
Provision of compensation against the incidence of unsafety is much more suited
to regulation by the market than the allocation of safety. Compensation is sold in
units, at a price per unit, and in keeping roughly with the actuarial cost of the
prospectively incident unsafety. The purchaser of compensation can, within limits,
purchase as much potential compensation as he desires, given his estimate both of
his financial needs if harmed and of his vulnerability to the incidence of unsafety.
Exchange of premium for protection can, therefore, generate reciprocity.53
The market accessible to suppliers and demanders of safety cannot establish
reciprocity between them, both because of externalities and because of discontinuities
in the supply of safety and the demand for it. The market can, however, supply
much information relevant both to the optimum provision of safety and to the insti-
tutionalization of rules insuring the equitable and the economic administration of
compensation. Indeed, given the costs of safety and the demand for it, an efficient
market would determine what amount of safety is optimal, compatibly with the
terms on which compensation for harm is to be had 5' These terms may, however,
prove inordinately costly as is the U.S. auto-insurance system, best described as a
model of expensive inefficiency. Under this system only $i in compensation is paid
victims for each $2.20 in premiums and taxes; contingent-fee and other lawyers,
together with overhead, eat up the rest. 5
Safety is not costless. Providing it absorbs scarce resources which have alterna-
tive uses; these constitute the visible costs of safety. The visible cost of producing
any particular kind of safety is likely to rise as Si (= i-U1) increases, sometimes with
the result that S1 cannot be increased beyond some value less than unity. The
provision of safety may also entail hidden costs, especially in a dynamic society when
the "safety" in question is the result of the imposition of excessive controls upon
man's inventive and innovative activities.
" See L. FULLER, supra note 29, ch. i, on reciprocity and exchange, and the moralities of "aspiration"
and "duty."
", Within limits such compensation is a substitute for safety. Its availability, together with the terms
of availability, conditions the extent and the shape of the demand curve for a particular kind of safety.
The degree of safety present, compatible with optimal resource use, will be affected by the price of a
given amount of compensation which may affect the behavior of potential victims and by the amount for
which agents responsible for experienced unsafety are liable. As S. Rottenberg shows, the economic
conception of liability is more conducive to bringing about optimal safety than is the applicable rule of
law. Rottenberg, Liability in Law and Economics, 55 Am. EcoN. REv. z07 (1965). The economic rule
equates liability with correctly computed loss.
" The Business with 1o3 Million Unsatisfied Customers, TimE, Jan. 26, 1968, at 20. "Contingent
fees . . . now provide roughly one-third of the U.S. bar's total income." Id.; Graham, To Speed Up
Car Suits, N.Y. Tim"es, Feb. 18, 1968, § 4, P. 7, col. I. See A. Cosard et al., AUTOMOBILE AccIDENT
CosTs AND PAYMENTS (1964).
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The visible costs of increments in safety may be approximated when it is the
product of a single decision maker in, say, a plant in which the variability and
hence the average quality of the human factor is roughly constant. Then both
the costs of rendering equipment and physical environment more safe and of im-
proving the performance of workers can be approximated.
It is more difficult to estimate the costs of safety when it is the joint product of
two or more distinct decision makers. Consider the automobile or, for that matter,
any comparable instrument. A car manufacturer can estimate the cost of adding
safety-producing features to a car, but he cannot estimate how much the safety of
his cars will be increased. For how safe a car is depends also, presumably in a
major degree, upon the quality of the driver of this car and the nature of the environ-
ment in which it is driven. The cost of improving this combination is not easy to get
at. It is possible, of course, to increase safety greatly and at little or no resource cost:
(a) by denying the right to drive to any small fraction of drivers responsible for
a relatively large fraction of the harm occasioned by cars and of the compensation
paid victims by insurers; and (b) by adjusting premiums systematically to the
degree of risk which a driver imposes on his insurer and hence thereby providing
him with incentive to reduce this risk. These courses of action have not been
taken; neither a rational system of driver-license denial nor an orderly set of
safety-encouraging differential premiums has been introduced." In fact, so un-
satisfactory is the insurance system that some believe the federal government may take
it over if it is not improved.
When safety is a public good, its aggregate cost is relatively easy to estimate,
unless the good in question is a multipurpose one yielding other products as well
as safety. Even so, the contribution to safety, together with its cost, can be esti-
mated with reasonable accuracy.
Sometimes safety may be produced in several ways. Then the cheaper means
is the one to be chosen. For example, relief for forms of urban pollution may be
provided through the creation of a public instrumentality. Or the pollution may be
prevented through use of a system of economic penalties and rewards under which
the originators of the pollution are held responsible. The latter method is likely to
be the preferable one 7 Of course, if the pollution is the product of many small
suppliers, the public instrumentality may be the only satisfactory means unless, as
"'See TIME, supra note 54, at 2x-22. The concept of accident proneness has been criticized by W.
HAnmN et al., supra note z2, at 387-444, and by M. SCHULZINGoR, supra note 18, at 13-14. But the
Time article herein cited reports a study which concluded that "if 20% of the country's drivers lost their
licenses ... the accident rate would go down 8o%."
" See Krutilla, Is Public Intervention in Water Resources Development Conducive to Economic
Efficiency?, 6 NATuRAL RFsouzcas J. 6o (1966); Krutilla, An Economic Approach to Coping with Flood
Damage, 2 WAmTR REsouRcEs REse .AcH 183 (1966); CONTROLLING POLLUTION (M. Goldman ed. 1967).
On air pollution, much more difficult to cope with economically and legally, see generally Symposium,
Air Pollution Control, 33 Lxw & CNTEmp. PROB. 195 (x968); Tim EcoNomics OF Am PoI.Lotn- (H.
Wolozia ed. 1966).
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with automobiles, pollution-suppressing devices may be attached to the sources of
the pollution.
Turning now to the hidden costs of safety. This category does not include costs
described as externalities even though these may be hidden in the present or lurk in
the future as developing sequelae to current safety-intending actions. I have in mind
rather the fruits of scientific and technical progress which are prevented from being
initiated and/or matured for fear that attempts at initiation or maturation will
produce injury in the present. A case in point is the heavy penalizing or the
actual prohibition of experimentation with, or therapeutic use of, drugs which may
inflict injury in the present, even though in time they are very likely to be developed
into widely effective therapeutic agents. A probable effect of such penalties and
prohibitions is the prevention of scientific undertakings which, while they may bring
injury or death to a few persons today, could in the end bring relief to tens of
thousands. Here a statistical approach is indicated, coupled with a system of
insurance that will adequately remunerate those injured today (or their survivors).
It is absurd to deny an improved therapy to thousands for fear that a small number
of persons seeking an untested form of such therapy today may suffer. Another case
in point would be the rigid control of the use of contraception pills or devices on
the ground that these allegedly had produced adverse effects in a few instances.
Actions of the sort described are on a par with current judicial fetishism which
seems to prefer liberty for a criminal few at the expense of the safety of the lawv-
abiding multitude.
Estimating the demand for safety presents even more difficulties than estimating
its cost. In a sense, something like an estimate is most easily had when safety is a
public good supplied by an agency of the state or a large private collectivity. Then
careful estimates need to be made of the supposed benefits as well as of the probable
costs (e.g., flood control, road improvement, health programs, and so forth).8 When
the aggregate value of the benefits sufficiently exceeds that of the costs, it may be
inferred that the implicit rational demand is great enough to warrant the safety-
producing undertaking. Of course, there is also a redistributive problem in that often
many beneficiaries may escape bearing costs while nonbeneficiaries do bear them.
The demand for various kinds of safety is often widely dispersed, with the
result that a collective demand for it does not become manifest unless mobilized by
trade unions or other organized groups. Even then it is likely to be difficult to
convert this sort of "demand" into a function connecting prices and quantities. A
better notion of what persons are willing to pay for antidotes to unsafety may be
derivable, as suggested earlier, from the degree to which they provide themselves
with insurance to supply compensation in the event of harm flowing from unsafety.
Given any kind of inferred demand curve for safety, it is likely to be inelastic in its
lower reaches though subject to upward shifts as the incomes of potential buyers rise.
us See Prest & Turvey, Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Survey, 3 SuRVEYs OF Ecoxomic THEORY x55 (1966).
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It is probable that the demand for safety is overestimated, in part because in
an uncertain world the possible adverse consequences of unsafety are underestimated.
It is probable also that the cost of providing a high degree of safety is underestimated.
Accordingly, had we explicit curves for particular kinds of safety, the point of
equilibrium between supply and demand would probably fall quite short of the
level one might infer from public discussion of safety and its promotion. Pre-
sumably much more attention needs to be given to the provision of compensation in
the event of the incidence of unsafety.
Despite the difficulties that beset attempts to estimate the demand for particular
kinds of safety, together with the costs of supplying this demand, it is desirable that
these attempts be made. The economic motive usually is the most powerful of
motives. It stimulates men to hold down unsafety and to increase safety compatibly
with the cost of doing so and the willingness of safety-seekers to pay for safety.
CONCLUSION
This essay has been concerned with the role played by resource scarcity, the
resulting costliness of safety, and the supposed demand for safety. It has been in-
ferred that the demand for safety tends to be exaggerated while its cost tends to be
underestimated, especially in a dynamic, scarcity-ridden world. It has been argued
that too much is invested in less important forms of safety (e.g., cigarettes, motor
cars, control of less important diseases) and too little in more important forms.
Greater dependence on economic motivation, it is inferred, would provide a more
nearly optimal amount of safety. Greater recourse to the purchase of rights to
compensation against harm from unsafety is also indicated, together with improved
rules regarding the determination of eligibility to claims of various sorts. Recourse
to economic motivation, it is suggested, reduces the dependence of the community
upon ponderous, expensive, and sometimes ineffective public agencies.
Finally, three additional points were stressed. First, it was shown that in a
dynamic world there is much uncertainty and the adverse effects of technological
change are far flung. Commensurate preventive as well as -compensatory measures
are indicated. Second, the state itself is apt to be a major source of unsafety both
because of what it does and because of the support it may give vast corporations and
powerful pressures groups which are thus enabled to become sources of unsafety.
Witness the failure of highway bureaucracies to adopt what appear to be economically
justifiable and superior means to safety; or the actions of national leaders in un-
necessarily exposing tens of millions to extermination in this age of potential
megadeath; or the subjection of communities to experimentation at the hands of
nonpragmatic "experts." 59 Third, it has been reasoned that a cost-benefit approach,
"See Posin, Bureaucracy and Highway Safety, Naw REPuELIC, March 23, 1968, at 15; H. SACKMAN,
COMPUTERS, SYSTIAS SCIENCE, AND EVOLVING SOCIETY (1967); see also R. LAPP, THE WEAPONS CULTURE
(x968).
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in keeping with economically correct marginal costs and benefits is the one most
likely to result in the right amount of safety.
From what has been said it is evident that even the administration of criminal
and/or civil justice can be made prohibitively and self-defeatingly costly. For ex-
ample, when the conduct of criminal justice is made subject to more and more
constraint, the cost of administering it and thereby guarding the safety of citizens
rises commensurately, finally beyond the point at which resources are forthcoming to
sustain this increase in costs. Up to this point a given degree of safety against
criminal undertakings is maintained, albeit at rising cost, but beyond this point
the degree of safety declines. At issue ultimately is how much "safety" is to be
provided and how it is to be distributed among the groups composing society.
It is evident also that, with the steady growth of state intervention and the
consequent exercise of the "power of eminent domain," a re-examination of what
constitutes "just compensation" is very much in order. For, when the compensation
provided by the state fails to counterbalance roughly the disabilities inflicted by the
state upon the individual subjected to the power of eminent domain, he suffers the
equivalent of an increase in unsafety. He is dislodged from a higher preference
function and made to locate on a lower one. He suffers injury, and the injury may
prove to be physical as well as mental. Yet there usually exists some amount of
compensation that will offset his injury and restore him to the preference function
on which he was originally lodged. Undoubtedly, if the state is made to pay full or
nearly full compensation, pressure will be brought upon the agencies immediately
responsible for the exercise of eminent domain to proceed in such fashion as to
minimize the initial injury and hence the amount of compensation ultimately re-
quired. The final outcome would then probably be roughly equivalent to that
which a free market might have produced. There are, of course, many considerations,
including ethical principles, to be taken into account when resolving diverse prob-
lems of compensation. Even so, their resolution is bound to be greatly facilitated
through as much recourse as possible to a free market or its analogue."0
"o For a splendid review of the issues and modes of resolution, see Michelman, Property, Utility, and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "lust Compensation" Law, 8o HAtv. L. REv. 1165
(1967). See also Dennison v. State, 37 U.S.L.W. 2053 (N.Y. Ct. App., July i, 1968).
